We explore how the readability of annual reports varies with earnings management. Using the Fog Index to measure readability (Li 2008) , and focusing on the management discussion and analysis section of the annual report (MD&A), we predict and find that firms that are most likely to have managed earnings to beat the prior year's earnings have MD&As that are more difficult to read. In addition, we find that readability has marginal but incremental power in predicting financial misstatements when added to the F-Score model of Dechow et al. (2011) 
INTRODUCTION
The seminal work of Li (2008) explored the relationship between the readability of annual reports and financial performance. Borrowing the Fog Index from computation linguistics, where a higher reading on the Fog Index indicates disclosures that are more difficult to understand, Li finds a negative relationship between Fog and the level of earnings. It is unclear whether this result is due to managers providing complex disclosures to obfuscate bad performance or that bad news is simply harder to be communicated (Li, 2008; Bloomfield, 2008) . To further explore these two explanations, obfuscation or ontology, and to better understand managers' use of complex disclosures, we look at instances in which firms are more likely to have managed earnings upwards to meet or beat an earnings benchmark (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997) . When financial performance is achieved partly by earnings management, we expect the explanations management provides for that performance will be less readable than explanations provided by firms not engaging in earnings management. In other words, we expect that when reported performance differs from underlying fundamentals, we expect managers to try to make it harder for investors to identify such earnings management behavior, in line with the "Incomplete Revelation Hypothesis" (Bloomfield, 2002) . Our results suggest that the readability level of financial disclosures goes beyond the one derived from the ontological explanation of good vs.
bad news being disclosed. Instead, we find that managers strategically use corporate disclosure to mislead or to influence investors' understanding of firm's value.
Our study is motivated by the large number of papers that build on results from Li (2008) , but rely mostly on the Obfuscation Hypothesis when developing their predictions, and disregard Li's cautionary statement and Bloomfield (2008) discussion that there are alternative explanations to Li's empirical findings, and their call for more research required to distinguish between Obfuscation and Ontology.
Our paper is also motivated by the importance and richness of the textual component of corporate reports-an average of 80% of an annual report, for instance. The SEC highlighted the importance of textual disclosures when it issued a set of rules requiring plain English disclosures.
Christopher Cox, Chairman of the SEC, went further and suggested "just as the Black-Scholes model is commonplace when it comes to compliance with the stock option compensation rules, we may soon be looking to the Gunning-Fog and Flesch-Kincaid models to judge the level of compliance with the plain English rules." If readability is going to be used as a measure of compliance, then we should understand the factors that affect how managers choose the level of readability.
Our analysis focuses on the readability of the management discussion and analysis (MD&A) section of the annual report-a section that is required by law but also a medium where managers have discretion on how to present an explanation of the company's business, financial conditions, and results of operation. The MD&A is one the most read and most important components of financial statements, and the argument that it has information content is supported by prior literature (Li [2010] for a review of the literature). The fixed structure, content and periodicity in MD&As trade off with the flexibility and spontaneity in alternative settings, such as conference calls. Although conference calls may provide researchers with more room to identify management behavior, managers may have more discretion over the content, and therefore, more chances to avoid sensitive issues. Bloomfield (2012) argues that " [t] he structure of conference calls might also reduce [predictive] power," in line with findings in Mayew (2008) . Mayew shows that managers are more likely to grant permission to ask questions to analysts that are more favorable. By doing so, managers limit "the direct questions that would be most likely to elicit direct deception and associated linguistic behavior."
The earnings benchmark we use is the prior year's earnings (rather than earnings forecasts or zero earnings) because anecdotal evidence suggests that management's discussions in the annual report are more likely to compare and contrast performance in the current fiscal year with that in the prior year (or years). Forecasted earnings, whether by sell-side analysts or by management, are seldom referenced in annual reports. Zero and small positive earnings events are relatively infrequent, so we reserve this benchmark for supplemental analyses.
Our setting allows us to consider all three conditions leading to earnings manipulation, as presented by Turner, Mock, and Srivastava [2003] ; namely, there are three conditions generally identified when fraud occurs: Incentive/Pressure, Opportunity, and Attitude/Rationalizations. Li (2012) highlights the importance of not relying solely on the Attitude/Rationalizations condition.
In order to increase the power of our tests, we combine the role of textual analysis with variations in incentives and opportunities. In particular, we explore management's incentives to engage in myopic behavior to beat benchmarks. Bhojra, Hribar, Picconi, and McInnis (2009) find that firms that just meet earnings expectations likely to be due to earnings management via accruals and/or real activities exhibit a short-term stock price benefit relative to firms that miss earnings expectations with no earnings management. To leave room for management's opportunities, we focus on management's use of discretion over accruals and expenses to meet earnings expectations.
Our findings on the attitude/rationalizations are consistent with our hypotheses.
Controlling for the relationship between Fog and the overall earnings level as well as other known factors, we find robust evidence that Fog is higher for firms that meet or just beat prior year's earnings (MBE). We further identify firms in the MBE sample that are more likely to have managed earnings upwards using accruals or real activities, and find consistently higher Fog for this subgroup but not for other MBE firms. In two further tests, we use firm-years with earnings that were misstated or required subsequent restatement as clear indicators of earnings management. In these smaller samples, we find that Fog is higher for firm-years with restated or misstated earnings.
In addition to exploring whether firms that manage earnings have less readable financial reports, we turn the analysis on its head and test whether readability predicts financial misstatements along the lines of Dechow et al. (2011) . We find that the Fog Index is a marginal but statistically significant predictor when added to the F-score model of Dechow et al.
Our contribution to the literature is two-fold. First, we add to our understanding of the determinants of readability. More specifically, we refine the overall relationship between readability and financial performance. While the overall pattern documented by Li (2008) is one where higher earnings associates with lower Fog, we provide evidence that this relationship is discontinuous (or at least non-monotonic) around the benchmark of the prior year's earnings, particularly for firms that are likely to have managed accruals. Second, we show that earnings management, that is, using accounting discretion with the aim of concealing underlying performance, manifests itself as more complex disclosures. Our evidence is consistent with managers strategically choosing higher reporting complexity in conjunction with earnings management in an attempt to conceal the latter, which is a new finding in the literature. Overall, we add to a more complete understanding of the relationship between financial report readability and reported performance.
Aside from Li (2008) , this paper is also closely related to Larcker and Zakolyukina (2012, "LZ") . However, LZ and this paper differ in a number of important ways. First, LZ's primary interest is finding linguistic predictors for financial restatements (i.e., restatements are the dependent variable) whereas this paper's primary interest is in understanding the determinants of readability (i.e., the Fog score is the dependent variable). Second, whereas LZ examine voluntary conference calls, we examine MD&A disclosures that are required by law.
Third, LZ analyze verbal communication but we examine textual disclosures, which result in differing levels of preparation, forethought, and spontaneity. This last difference is important because our hypothesis is based upon management's deliberate attempt to obscure the financial picture to hide earnings management, whereas LZ's hypothesized effect derives in large part from inadvertent signals conveyed (e.g., use of different pronouns, hesitations, expression of anxiety). In sum, this paper differs from LZ in research question, whether the disclosure is mandatory, as well as the degree of preparation possible for the different avenues of disclosure.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes our hypotheses. Sections 3 and 4 contain our analyses of the first and second hypotheses, respectively. Section 4 concludes.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
In computational linguistics, the Gunning Fog Index, or just Fog Index, is a function of the number of words per sentence plus the percentage of words that are complex (i.e., having three or more syllables). This sum is scaled by a constant (0.4) such that the Fog value approximates the number of years of formal education required to understand the text.
The Fog Index was first brought into the accounting literature by Li (2008) , who examined how readability of annual reports varies with financial performance. Li found a negative relationship between profitability and Fog (i.e., profitable firms have less complex reports compared with firms with losses). He also found that firms with more persistent positive earnings have lower Fog.
In the discussion of Li (2008 ), Bloomfield (2008 provides a number of potential explanations for the observed relationships between readability and financial performance. Two are particularly salient here. First is obfuscation-that managers try to hide bad news by writing text that is more difficult to decipher. Second is ontology-that bad news is inherently more difficult to communicate.
Bloomfield provides two other potential explanations that could also be considered variation of ontology. He suggests that loss firms need to provide more explanation as a result of "management by exception." He also suggests that the nature of accounting conservatismrecognizing bad news in a more timely fashion than good news-requires managers to provide more explanation about the future when there are losses. In sum, obfuscation requires conscious actions to affect readability, whereas the ontological explanations suggest that readability is inherently a function of the circumstances. As will be seen below, our analyses will have bearing on these two explanations.
With regard to financial performance, there is a substantial literature documenting the frequency, motivations, and benefits that accrue to firms that are able to meet or beat benchmarks. In recent decades, some two-third to three-quarters of firms will meet or beat expectations in the capital market (as proxied by analyst forecasts). The rewards of doing so are higher stock returns, lower information asymmetry, and lower cost of capital (Bartov et al., 2002; Brown et al., 2009) . These firm-level effects translate into personal benefits via executive compensation directly through higher stock and option value, or indirectly through discretionary bonuses.
The incentives for management to meet or beat earnings benchmarks also lead some managers to use their accounting discretion to achieve their performance. For instance, Burghstahler and Dichev (1997) document unusually low (high) frequencies of firms reporting small earnings decreases (increases) and small losses (profits), suggesting that earnings management is the source of these irregular distributions of earnings outcomes.
Depending on the context, some benchmarks will be more salient than others. In the capital market context, the expectations in the market is the most relevant-meeting or falling short of the market's expectations is what determines changes in stock prices. In other instances, zero earnings is the relevant benchmark-maintaining a positive level of earnings is important for reasons of contractual provisions and general loss aversion, for examples. A third benchmark is the prior year's performance, which is equivalent to a benchmark of zero change in earnings.
We focus on the third benchmark for two reasons. First, our analysis of readability focuses on annual reports, and the MD&A section in particular. MD&A is a disclosure required by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
1 As a regulated disclosure, it is reasonable to expect management to discuss facts and figures that are already contained in the audited financial statements and elsewhere in the annual report rather than information from the capital markets, such as analyst forecasts, which can change frequently. Second, the requirement to comment on trends suggests that management would rather have a zero or positive earnings change rather than having to explain a decline in earnings, which could arguably be interpreted as the beginning of a downward trend. Third, we focus on the zero earnings change benchmark rather than the zero earnings benchmark to obtain more time-series variation in meeting/beating vs. missing the benchmark. That is, there are some firms that are persistently profitable while others are persistently not; the number of firms at or close to zero profitability is relatively small.
(Nevertheless, we provide some supplementary tests of this alternative benchmark to augment our main analyses.)
While the relationship between Fog and earnings levels documented by Li (2008) is negative overall, we expect that firms at or just above the zero earnings change benchmark will tend to show a different relationship. First, if at least some of the firms in this region of earnings performance are able to do so via upward earnings management, then the underlying performance that they would have otherwise reported would have been lower, which would have a commensurately higher Fog. That is, all else equal, the readability for the underlying performance is lower than for the reported performance. We expect this first effect to be small because our analysis focuses on a small range of earnings (i.e., earnings changes close to zero).
Earnings management involves degrees of untruth. Within the accounting discretion available, management makes biased choices to increase earnings. In some cases, the earnings management falls outside acceptable levels and is considered (fraudulent) misrepresentation. In either case, management must try to hide the deception so as not to be discovered; i.e., earnings management cannot be transparent for management to believe that it would have the intended effect. Deceptive communication is linguistically more complex and also cognitively more demanding.
2 Because it is difficult to be untruthful, liars will tend to tell simpler stories, which can counteract the tendency of lies to be linguistically more complex. Which of these two forces dominates is an empirical question.
Based on the above discussion, our first hypothesis is as follows (stated in alternative form):
H1:
Firms that have managed earnings in a particular year have annual report disclosures in that year that are less readable, ceteris paribus.
2 "… from a cognitive perspective, truth tellers should be able to discuss exactly what did and did not happen because they were actually there to witness the event being discussed. Liars, on the other hand, would be forced to keep track of what they have previously said to avoid contradicting themselves later" (Hancock et al., 2007) .
Beyond this general hypothesis, we have three subsidiary hypotheses with increasing specificity:
H1A: Firm-years with zero or slightly positive earnings changes will have annual report disclosures that are less readable, ceteris paribus.
H1B: Firm-years with (i) zero or slightly positive earnings changes and (ii) income-increasing discretionary accruals or real activities earnings management will have annual report disclosures that are less readable, ceteris paribus.
H1C: Firm-years with (i) zero or slightly positive earnings changes and (ii) high income increasing discretionary accruals or real activities earnings management will have annual report disclosures that are less readable, ceteris paribus.
These three predictions relate to firm-years that we suspect of containing managed earnings.
However, these classification schemes use purely quantitative data and there is likely a certain amount of misidentification (Dechow et al. 1995) . Therefore, we use the superior accuracy of human investigators to identify instances of earnings management. Therefore, we also make two additional predictions using restatements and misstatements.
H1D: Firm-years with financial information that was subsequently restated will have annual report disclosures that are less readable, ceteris paribus.
H1E:
Firm-years with misstatements will have annual report disclosures that are less readable, ceteris paribus.
Restatements are adjustments to financial statements as tracked by Audit Analytics; we do not examine all restatements, but only those identified by Audit Analytics as relating to fraud or SEC investigations. Misstatements are those reported in Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER), which may or may not subsequently result in restatements. Using restatements and misstatements is more accurate in identifying instances of earnings management, but also potentially misses some earnings management activity that has not been the subject of regulatory action. In this regard, this identification strategy is complementary to the earlier strategy using small positive earnings changes, which likely classifies too many firms as having managed earnings.
Although not the main focus of this study, our second hypothesis further explores the idea that deception results in more complex writing. Dechow et al. (2011) used the sample of firms reporting misstatements in AAER published by the SEC to estimate a model that produced a likelihood of financial misstatement ("F-Score"). Along with this model, we hypothesize that writing complexity can be used as a factor to help identify firms misstating financial statements.
Our second hypothesis is as follows:
H2: Firms with less readable financial reports are more likely to have misstated financial statements.
In the next two sections, we describe our empirical analyses and results of testing these two hypotheses.
TEST OF HYPOTHESIS 1
To test the first hypotheses, we use a sample of firm-years with available data between 2000 and 2012. We require financial data from Computat as well as MD&A disclosures on the SEC's Edgar system. Details of required financial data items will be provided below. We exclude firms in the utilities and financial services industries (SIC 4400-5000 and 6000-6999). Table 1 shows the results of the sample selection procedure. The final sample consists of 26,967 firm-years and 4,855 unique firms.
The first hypothesis concerns the influence of earnings management on readability. To test this hypothesis, we require measures of readability, earnings management, and control variables that are known to affect readability. Therefore, the general form of equation we use to test this hypothesis is as follows:
where EM refers to the earnings management proxy. The follow discussion provides additional details for this equation.
Readability
We use the Gunning Fox Index to measure readability. As mentioned above, the Fog Index is computed as follows:
The number of words per sentence is computed as the ratio of the total number of words divided by the number of sentences. Complex words are those having three or more syllables. Longer sentences and a higher proportion of complex words increase Fog, meaning a reduction in readability. The Fog Index has been used widely and has seen increasing usage in the accounting literature (e.g., Miller, 2010; Lehavy et al., 2011; Rennekamp, 2012) .
Earnings management
We use a number of different proxies for earnings management. Our first and simplest measure uses the approach of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997): we identify firms having a higher likelihood of managing earnings as those firms with earnings in the neighborhood of meeting or just beating past year's earnings. We conduct our main tests using earnings per share (EPS), but we also present results for earnings deflated by total assets. In either case, we measure earnings before extraordinary items. We define the variable MBE = 1 if ΔEPS falls in the neighborhood from zero to a small positive number; otherwise MBE = 0. We use a range of values to define the "small positive number" to ensure robustness of results.
The MBE measure is based on the outcome of earnings management, and misclassifies firms that have earnings in the neighborhood just above the MBE benchmark even in the absence of earnings management. Therefore, we also examine the process of earnings management, namely using discretionary accruals or real activities.
For discretionary accruals, we use the Jones (1991) model in our main tests:
where TotAccr t are total operating accruals, ΔRev t is the change in revenues from year t-1 to t, PPE t is gross property, plant, and equipment, and TA t-1 is total assets at the end of year t-1. The residuals from this estimation form the discretionary accruals (DA). In supplementary tests, we also use the modified Jones model from Dechow et al. (1995) and the performance-matched model of Kothari et al. (2005) with similar results as reported below. We estimate each model cross-sectionally by industry and year, and require at least 15 observations.
For real activities earnings management, we focus on discretionary expenses (Roychowdhury 2006) , specifically research and development (R&D) and advertising expenses.
We define real activities earnings management (RAM) as the negative sum of (ΔR&D expense + ΔAdvertising expense), deflated by beginning total assets. Larger reductions in R&D or advertising expenses result in more positive values of RAM.
Discretionary accrual models have large amounts of measurement error and suffer from low power (Dechow et al., 1995) , and similarly for measures of real activities earnings management. We do not simply use these measures to proxy for earnings management. Rather, we interact them with our first measure, MBE, to increase the power of detecting firms that have managed earnings, because together the variables capture both the process and outcome of earnings management. Furthermore, managing earnings to meet or beat past earnings presumably involves upward (not downward) earnings management, so we identify firm-years with positive earnings management using the indicator variables PosEM(DA) and PosEM(RA) for, respectively, accrual and real activities management that increases income; the complement is NegEM(). Therefore, our second measure to identify firms that are likely to have managed earnings upwards is MBE × PosEM(DA) and MBE × PosEM(RA). We also construct a composite variable to capture both types of earnings management:
Our third measure of earnings management refines the second one just described but uses not only the sign of the earnings management, but also the magnitude. We separate firms with positive discretionary accruals into high and low partitions using the median value, resulting in HighPosEM(DA) and LowPosEM(DA); similary for positive real activities earnings management. Our third measure of firms most likely to have managed earnings upwards is thus
Our fourth proxy for earnings management is whether a firm-year's financial statements had been restated, as identified in Audit Analytics. Because some restatements result from relatively benign reasons, we focus on restatements that Audit Analytics has flagged as (i)
resulting from fraud or (ii) being initiated by or resulted in an SEC investigation. Our fifth proxy is whether a firm-year's financial statements were misstated according to AAER.
Control variables
Our list of control variables derives from Li (2008) . The most important of these in our context are the earnings-related variables. The first is Earnings, which is the level of earnings reported, which is expected to be negatively associated with Fog (i.e., firm-years with high earnings have more readable MD&A) based on Li (2008) . Depending on the specification, Earnings is either EPS before extraordinary items, or earnings before extraordinary items deflated by beginning total assets. Closely related in the variable NegEarnChg, which equals 1 if the change in
Earnings is negative. We also control for firm-years with losses with the indicator Loss, which equal 1 when Earnings < 0, because losses are presumably bad news, which is likely to make disclosures less readable Li (2008) .
We include all of the 12 other control variables used in Li (2008) . We provide details for these variables in Appendix A. Li (2008) . 3 While there are many correlations among the variables that are statistically significant due to our large sample size, the magnitudes are mostly modest and should not pose a problem with multicollinearity. Overall, this first set of results-firms with relatively good news of a small positive earnings change having MD&A sections that are on average less readable than firms disclosing worse news-is inconsistent with a purely ontological explanation.
Descriptive statistics

Results -Test of Hypothesis 1A
To address the scale issue related to using EPS, we show results of measuring profitability as earnings before extraordinary items deflated by total assets. We also conduct a placebo test to confirm that the results found are not spurious due to persistent firm-specific factors. In particular, we want to reduce the possibility that some unmodelled factors omitted from our analysis but correlated with the propensity to meet/beat explain the variation in MD&A readability. To this end, we include MBE t-1 to see if meeting or beating in the prior year is at all associated with current MD&A readability. Table 5 Panel B
shows that the coefficient on MBE t-1 is not significantly different from zero (t = 0.445), while the coefficient on MBE t continues to be significantly positive and with similar magnitudes as in Table 4 . This placebo test suggests that the result on MBE found in Table 4 is unlikely to be spuriously caused by omitted variables.
A third test that we conduct to confirm our results in Table 4 is to increase the precision of the MBE variable to distinguish firms that beat the benchmark with earnings management from firm that do so without earnings management. (Later analyses in Tables 6 and 7 will also do this using models of discretionary accruals and real activities; the test here uses the properties of the earnings themselves.) We identify firms that just met or beat the past year's EPS, with the added condition of EPS in the first three fiscal quarters current year having fallen behind the amount in the first three quarter of the preceding year. We denote this indicator variable as
MBE_ByQ4. The additional condition increases the likelihood of identifying firms that managed earnings upwards in the final quarter of the fiscal year to meet or beat the annual earnings of the prior year. Panel C of Table 5 contains the results of this analysis. Again, the indicator variable of earnings management, MBE_ByQ4, is significantly positive (coeff = 0.22 to 0.25, t = 2.19 to 2.27).
Overall, the adjusted R-squared values in both Tables 4 and 5 are around 13% (and higher in the matched samples), which are similar but slightly higher than the 10% reported in Li (2008) . The results so far support Hypothesis 1A. We find consistent evidence that, while higher earnings is associated with more readable MD&A, losses are associated with less readable reports, but meeting or just beating is also associated less readable reports. The ontology explanation suggests that it is possible and even likely that good news is inherently easier and bad new is inherently more difficult to explain. Our evidence suggests that the good new of meeting or just beating past earnings is also harder to explain, which is contrary to the ontological explanation. This result could arise if the good news is artificial and some amount of obfuscation is required to make the underlying performance less transparent. We investigate this possibility further in the next tests of H1B and H1C.
Results -tests of Hypotheses 1B and 1C
Considering only whether a firm met or just beat the prior year's earnings as we did in the test of H1A involves misclassifying firms that would have met or just beat prior year's earnings without any earnings management. To improve the identification of firms that are more likely to have managed earnings, we consider the process of earnings management used to achieve that earnings outcome. We estimate firms' discretionary accruals and real activity earnings management in addition to whether it met or beat prior earnings. Table 6 Table 4 for MBE alone without considering accruals. Consistent with this larger magnitude, we find the coefficient for MBE × NegDA to be insignificant; that is, the effect found in Table 4 is concentrated in the subset with positive discretionary accruals. Firms that met or just beat prior earnings but have negative discretionary accruals do not exhibit more complex MD&A. This evidence supports Hypothesis 1B.
The results for real activities earnings management are similar, shown in Columns IV to VI in 
Supplemental robustness tests
We conduct three robustness checks to confirm our results above. For brevity, we present results based on the most specific definition of earnings management that combines both accrual and real activities management that we just used to test H1C (i.e., using MBE × HighPosEM( )). We also present results only for MBE defined to be ΔEPS ∈ [$0, $0.03]. Table 8 shows these results.
Panel A shows regression estimates when we include firm-level fixed effects or when we include lag(Fog) as an independent variable. These specifications are likely to be overly conservative due to overfitting; indeed, the R-squareds are around 70%. Nevertheless, the coefficient on MBE × HighPosEM(Comb) remains significantly positive, although the magnitude of the coefficient is lower compared to those in the previous tables. The coefficient on MBE × LowPosEM(Comp) is no longer significant. Panel B explores the potential effect of using other accrual models.
Column I uses the modified Jones model of Dechow et al. (1995) to measure discretionary accruals, and the results remain essentially the same as those reported in Table 7 , which uses the simpler Jones (1991) model. Column II uses the performance-matched accrual model of Kothari et al. (2005) . Again, the results are very similar to those reported in Table 7 except that the coefficient on MBE × LowPosDA is no longer significant, which is similar to what was found with firm-level fixed effects in Panel A.
Panel C of Table 8 considers the zero-earnings benchmark, instead of the zero earnings change benchmark we have examined in all the above analyses. We again observe very consistent results: whether we look at discretional accruals, real activities management, or both combined, the Fog score is higher for firms that meet or just beat the zero earnings benchmark and have high amounts of income-increase earnings management (coefficient = 0.28 to 0.49; t = 2.31 to 5.68). The magnitudes of the coefficients are similar to that found previously (compare with Table 7 Columns III, VI, and IX).
Thus far, we have used quantitative techniques to identify firm-years that are more likely to contain significant earnings management. Turning to the human-assisted identification of earnings management, we now look at the results. Table 9 shows the results when earnings management is identified by financial restatements that have been identified as fraudulent or relating to SEC investigations. In the first specification, the indicator variable Restate is significantly positive (coefficient = 0.254, t = 2.297), meaning that firm-years with restatements have more complex MD&A. Now, since some restatements may be small in magnitude, we incorporate the magnitude of restatement in the variable RestateSeverityDecile, which ranges from 0 to 10, where 10 is the decile with the largest restatement and 1 the smallest, and 0 for no restatement. The result using this variable is also significantly positive (coefficient = 0.036, t = 2.156). Table 10 looks at the AAER sample of misstatements. Again, we find that firm-years with earnings management have less readable MD&A (Misstated coefficient = 0.318, t = 2.08).
In sum, we find consistent and robust evidence supporting Hypothesis 1 with different definitions of earnings management, different accrual models, controlling for different fixed effects, and using a placebo test. Next we examine whether readability is predictive of financial misstatements.
TEST OF HYPOTHESIS 2
Hypothesis 2 predicts that firm-years with less readable financial reports are more likely to have misstated financial statements. To test this hypothesis, we continue to focus on the readability of
MD&A as above. For the misstatements, we use the information provided in Accounting and
Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER) issued by the SEC. Table 11 shows how we obtain the 216 firm-years of misstatement observations used in out tests. The frequency of the misstatements peaked at 39 cases in the year 1999, and has been markedly less frequent in the latter years.
Model of misstatement
To test whether low readability is predictive of misstatements, we use the model F-Score model of Dechow et al. (2011) . Specifically, we use the variables in Model 2 of 
where Misstate = 1 if a firm-year had a misstatement, and Fog is as defined above. We use the same definitions for the other variables as in Dechow et al. (2011) , as shown in Appendix A. Table 12 shows the means and medians for the independent variables, separately for the misstatement sample, and for the remainder of the Compustat population with available data.
The misstatement sample has significantly higher values of the four variables for accrual quality
(RRST accruals, Change in receivables, Change in inventory, and %Soft assets). Change in cash
sales is also higher, as are the Existence of operating leases and Actual security issuances.
Change is employess is significantly lower for the misstatement sample. All of these differences are consistent with Dechow et al. (2011, Table 6 ). Readability as measured by Fog is not significantly different, while the length of the MD&A is longer for the misstatement sample. (Table 7) although we have less statistical significance due to our smaller misstatement sample size (195 vs. 449 firm-years). Importantly, the coefficient on Fog is positive and significant at the 5% level (coefficient = 0.025, Wald Chisquare = 3.689, p = 0.027). However, the predictive power of readability is low relative to the other three significant predictors (Change in receivables, %Soft assets, and Actual security issuance).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper extends the readability analysis of Li (2008) . Beyond the overall negative relations sample size.
between the Fog Index and financial performance (i.e., the positive relationship between readability and performance), we hypothesize and document a disruption to that overall pattern.
In the region where a firm meets or just beats the prior year's earnings, the Fog score increases and readability deteriorates. The effect is larger when we focus on subsets of firms within this neighborhood of earnings performance that are more likely to have engaged in accruals or real activities management to increase earnings. Overall, we find consistent and robust evidence that firms that are likely to have managed earnings to meet or beat the benchmark of the prior year's earnings on average have more complex MD&A reports. We find similar results for firms that meet or just beat the zero earnings benchmark. Using the F-Score model of Dechow et al. (2011), we also show that the Fog Index has modest predictive power incremental to known predictors.
If the ontological explanation proposed by Bloomfield (2008) were a sufficient explanation (i.e., that good performance is inherently easier to communicate than bad performance), then we should not observe the pattern we found. Our evidence suggests that, at least for firms that are most suspected of having managed earnings, obfuscation is involved in making the financial report more difficult to read.
Our results are also consistent with the commonly held belief, supported by empirical evidence, that telling the truth is easier than telling lies (Hancock et al., 2007) . Lying is difficult if it is to be convincing because the communicator has to ensure the consistency of the supposed "facts." While earnings management in many cases do not outright fall into the category of lying, the activity does involve some active efforts on the part of management to bias the financial statements through accruals or other means. Such actions create a discrepancy between unmanaged performance and reported performance, which can make it mentally more taxing to explain reported performance when management knows the underlying, unmanaged performance to be different. Earnings management also challenges managers' ethical standards, which again can cause cognitive stress, which can be indirectly connected to readability of their writing.
Further research can go beyond readability and explore how the specific content of the MD&A relates to benchmark beating and earnings management. For instance, do firms suspected of having managed earnings use different pronouns or a more passive writing style? Another avenue is to investigate other earnings benchmarks and the corresponding disclosures that would focus on those benchmarks (e.g., meeting or beating market expectations and conference calls). 
Appendix A Variable definitions
Readability variables
Fog
Market-related incentives
Actual security issuance
An indicator variable coded 1 if firm issued securities during year t (i.e., an indicator variable coded 1 if SSTK > 0 or DLTIS > 0)
Nonfinancial variables
Abnormal change in employees
Percentage change in the number of employees (EMP) -Percentage change in Assets (AT)
Off-balance-sheet variables Existence of operating leases
An indicator variable coded 1 if future operating lease obligations are greater than zero Note: "RSST" refers to the accrual model of Richarson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna (2005). Note: Predicted signs for variables from Li (2008) are as listed in that paper's Table 2 , but if the predicted sign differs from the empirical association, then we list it as "?" above. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels. 12.8% MBE_ByQ4 t measures by how far a firm is underperforming in the first 3 fiscal quarters compared with the same period in the prior year. Specifically, it is EPS in the first 3 quarter of year t-1 less EPS in the first 3 quarters of year t. Refer to Appendix A for definitions of other variables. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels. 
Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels. Non-misstating firm-years 24712 24712
Note: The sample of misstatement firms was reduced from 216 to 195 firm-years due to the unavailability of data for some of the regressions variables (number of employees in particular). Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels.
